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INTRODUCTION 
In his final presidential message, President Echeverria repeatedly referred to the 
efforts of his administration to improve Mexico's inequitable income distribu-
tion. Two other themes stand out in Echeverria's recapitulation of the objectives 
of his administration. They are the importance he attached to (I) the growth of 
the public sector to correct deficiencies in the provision of services (such as 
education, housing, nut.rition and health) to the lower income groups and to 
compensate for shortfalls in private sector investment, and (2) the efforts made 
to maintain the value of the Mexican peso with respect to the dollar.1 
Mexico's policy objectives under Echeverria may be briefly outlined as fbllows: 2 
1. to increase job creation capacity; 
2. to maintain the high growth rate industry has shown in the past; 
3. to offset through exports of manufactured goods the foreign exchange 
needed for the expansion of industry: 
4. to achieve a more balanced geographical distribution of industry and 
create new development policies in backward areas; 
5. to orient industrial production more strongly towards the needs of the 
great majority of the population; 
6. to reduce industry as dependent on foreign capital and in particular on 
the service packages it obtains from transnational enterprises, and 
7. to develop its own capital goods industry to neutralize capital for the 
country from cyclical fluctuations in the world economy. 
Javier Marquez summarized some dichotomies of the Mexican economic 
scene during the Echeverria period. These included:3 
1. the desire to use fiscal policy to reform the social scene, but then doing 
this on an inadequate tax base; 
2. the desire to raise exports, but seeking to do this while maintaining 
a fixed exchange rate in the face of accelerating inflation; 
3. the desire to strengthen public sector enterprises while trying to main-
tain their prices at unrealistically low rates, arid the striving for greater 
industrial efficiency under a policy. of protectionism. Mexico was 
forced to address these dilemmas when it.embarked on its stabilization 
programme in 1977. 
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The following sections attempt to show how these dichotomies in policy-
making when combined with several of the longer run structural trends produced 
the financial and economic crisis of 1976. 
PUBLIC SECTOR EXPANSION 
The critical destabilizing decision of the Echeverria administration appears to 
be that of expanding and relying on the public sector as the main vehicle for 
economic growth and rectifying social inequalities before developing an adequate 
tax and revenue generating base. Early in his administration:, Echeverria made 
an effort to increase taxes but failed under sharp opposition from the country's 
commercial banks and the private sector .4 His decision to expand public 
expenditure despite this setback resulted in the overall public sector deficit 
which had averaged 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product annually between 
1965 and 1970, increasing to an average of 5.7 per cent of GDP in the 1971-76 
period. By 1976,, the deficit was 9 .5 per cent of gross domestic product. 
Public sector revenue increased but not commensurately with expenditures; 
the increase in relation to GDP was from 11.3 per cent as an annual average in 
the mid to late 1960s to 17 per cent in the 1971-76 period. 
One of the more interesting facets of the federal budget during the Echeverria 
years was the role of the so-called decentralized agencies. In the period 1970-76, 
65 per cent of total budgeted revenues came from these organizations (as well 
as enterprises with state p;uticipation). The fact that the public sector depended 
so heavily on the decentralized agencies and enterprises has several implications. 
These companies were organized by the government in order to promote eco-
nomic development. That the public sector depended on them s0 heavily for 
revenues meant that with very few exceptions (such as the National Railways 
System and Conasupo) the prices charged for the goods and services produced 
and sold by these companies ha.d to be economically sound; i.e., they had to 
cover current costs and provide funds for expansion. 
Current expenditures of the public sector increased from an annual average 
of less than 6.5 per .cent of GDP in the mid to late 1960s to more than 17 per 
cent of GDP in the final two years of the Echeverria period. Public sector 
investment expenditures· increased from an annual average of less than 6 per 
cel).t of GDP in the first year of the Echeverria term to more than 12,per cent 
in the last year. Since private sector gross fixed investment remained fairly 
constant at 12 to 13 per cent of GDP between 1971 and 1976, gross fixed 
investment (public plus private) increased to an annual average of 21.3 per 
cent of GDP (compared with 18.2 per cent from 1965 to 1970). By contrast, 
public sector savings as a percentage of GDP declined from the annual average 
of 3 .3 per cent during the mid to late 1960s to 2 .6 per cent during the Echeverria 
term in office. 
The federal government's budget was such that the balance of current receipts 
over current expenditures covered 76 per cent of capital expenditures in 1971, 
but only 24 per cent in 1975. The ratio of current expenditures to current 
revenue, which had averaged 84 per cent in the 1965-70 period, averaged 
90 per cent between 1971 and 1976. Since current revenue tends to be between 
97 per cent and more than 99 per cent of total budgetary revenue of the federal 
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government, this savings decline inevitably resulted in increased federal govern-
ment deficits to finance investment which was itself growing. 
The largest increases in current federal government expenditures in the 
Echeverria period were for transfers, most of which went to public enterprises. 
The most important of these under budgetary control are the oil company 
(PEMEX), the electricity companies, and the railways. Clearly a substantial 
subsidy element was (and still is) involved in the operations of many of these 
enterprises resulting in a significant drain on tlie federal budget. 
In fact transfers to these enterprises increased from 2.3 per cent of GDP in 
the period 1960-68 to 3.4 per cent in 1973-76. The largest subsidies were 
geared towards: (1) reducing energy prices (oil, fuel and electricity); (2) operat-
ing the railroads; and (3) lowering food prices. Subsidies from the central govern-
ment to public sector enterprises and to the private sector in the form of 
reduced prices averaged 5.3 per cent of GDP in the 1973-76 period, compared 
with 3.5 per cent of GDP from 1969-1976. 
As a consequence of the spending-savings disparity, the annual borrowing 
requirement rose from about 3 per cent of GDP in the previous presidential 
administration to 8 per cent in the final years of the Echeverria period-. Of 
this, more than two-thirds came from internal sources and less than one-third 
from external sources. 
One of the best descriptions of this strategy was given in July 1976 by the 
Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 5 
The policy of public indebtedness which has been followed by the Govern-
ment of Mexico is based on the desire to expand productive activities 
and on an effort to improve the standard of living of and offer a more 
equitable life to a population growing at a considerable rate. 
As is the case with most developing countries, internal savings in 
Mexico are insufficient to meet the levels of investment required. Further-
more, our export derived income does not cover the foreign currency 
requirements generated by our import needs. The complementary resources 
(i.e. from international financial markets) are required by our struggle to 
achieve a rate df capital formation that will enable us to attain a high rate 
of economic growth and a sustained increase in the levels of our exports. 
Between 1971 and 197 6 Mexico's federal government budget deficit went from 
4.8 billion pesos (1 per cent of GDP) to 57.4 billion pesos (3.8 per cent of 
GDP); public sector investment (expressed in 1960 prices) more than doubled 
during that period while private investment increased by only 16 per cent. The 
number of state-owned corporations expanded from 86 in 1970 to 740 in 1976. 
By the end of the Echeverria period, public enterprises dominated the oil, 
electricity, steel, petrochemicals, banking, transportation, and communications 
industries, with the public sector accounting for around 45 per cent of GDP. 
In short the costs associated with Echeverria's budgetary decisions and the 
emphasis on increasing the public sector were (1) massive budget deficits; (2) 
considerable crowding out of the private se~tor from bank credit; (3) rising 
inflation; (4) a growing internal and external debt; and (5) eventually massive 
capital flight, reflecting the lack of confidence in government policy .6 
The decline in private sector confidence was reflected in capital flight 
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estimated at $4 billion in the eighteen months preceding the devaluation. From 
December 1975 to December 1976 the increase in peso liabilities of the banking 
system was only 10 per cent (less than half the percentage increase of the 
previous twelve months) whereas liabilities denominated in foreign currencies 
increased by 72 per cent (more than double the percentage increase in the 
previous twelve months). Reserve requirements on dollar deposits were 100 per 
cent compared with about 40 per cent for peso deposits. The disintermediation 
is apparent from data starting in 1972, but the process accelerated in 1976. 
The 'dollarization' in 1976 took a quantum leap and reflected the crisis mentality 
that existed.7 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DETERIORATION 
The key elements in Mexico's balance of payments after 1965 were the grow-
ing deficit in merchandize trade during the later 1960s and the acceleration 
of the deficit beginning in 1974. This pattern was certainly assolciated with 
Mexico's accumulating inflation (leading to the overvaluation of the peso). 
Money supply increases (Ml, cash plus demand deposits) were also considerably 
larger in the 1970-76 period than in the late 1960s (19 per cent annually com-
pared with 11 per cent) and clearly much of this demand spilled over into 
imports. 
In addition, the recession in the United States and elsewhere dampened 
demand for Mexican exports. Still Mexico's total merchandise exports grew 
by 37 per cent in 1974, but this was offset by the almost 60 per cent increase in 
importS. Exports did not grow at all in 1975. 
The current account deficit averaged 2.4 per cent of GDP between 1965-70 
and 3.7 per cent during 1971-76. In the final two years of the Echeverria admini-
stration (1975 and 1976), the current account deficits were 5.1and4.3 per cent 
of GDP. This deficit was financed with a growing level of capital imports.8 
In terms of the composition of exports, one interesting pattern was that of 
manufactured goods. Over the five-year period 1971-75 manufactured exports 
grew by 30 per cent per year, of which about 12 per cent per year was attribut-
able to price increases and 16 per cent per year represented real growth. 
In relative terms industrial exports were, however, still a small proportion 
of total manufacturing output compared with a number of the newly indus-
trializing countries, and in a sense even the relatively low aggregate export 
figures give a somewhat inflated picture of the overall competitive position of 
the country's industrial exports; i.e., in the early to mid-1970s nearly half.of 
Mexico's manufactured exports came from plants that assembled products 
for the US market; these were the border industry plants that relied on inputs 
imported in-bond ·from the United States, taking advantage of special pro-
visions in the US tariff that limit import duties for such products to value· 
added outside the United States. About two-thirds of assembly plant exports 
consisted of items such as electronic parts, television and communications 
equipment, while clothing was a smaller item. 
Exports outside the border areas were considerably more diversified, with 
non-electrical machinery, electrical l}lachinery and transport equipment exports 
amounting to $270 million (25 per cent of non-assembly plant manufactured 
exports) in 1975. Most of these exports consisted of parts or components-
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automobile engines and parts were the most important. Chemical exports ($204 
million in 1975-19 per cent ofnon-assembly plant manufactured exports) were 
largely based on natural resources such as sulphur, lead and zinc. These went 
mostly to the USA and LAFT A countries. Textile exports based on locally pro· 
duced henequen and cotton, and food product exports led by molasses and 
simply-preserved fruits and vegetables were also important. In spite of the con-
centration of exports within a few sectors, however, many sectors were exporting 
10 per cent or more of their output in 1974 (the last year for which these com-
parative data are available). These sectors included basic chemicals, fertilizers 
and pharmaceuticals-all principally based on natural resources. 
Despite some promising signs in the manufacturing area, however, exports 
from this sector- were not sufficient to offset the general erosion of the country's 
balance of payments position. The rapid deterioration in the balance of pay-
ments in the 1970s stemmed from a number of interrelated factors which can 
b~ summed up as the exhaustion of the internal sources of finance needed to 
sustain the pattern of industrialization followed in the 1960s. The deterioration 
of industrial funds and its counterpart, the growing dependence on foreign 
financial sources, is reflected in the rapid increase in (1) the industrial trade 
deficit (as a proportion of manufacturing production); (2) the growing inability 
of the agricultural, oil and service sectors to generate the external surpluses 
needed to finance that deficit; and (3) the resulting expansion of the residual 
deficit which in tum had to be financed by external sources. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Mexico's import substitution strategy was 
based on the premise that the resulting industrial trade deficit was (1) an in· 
evitable side effect of modernization and rapid development; (2) one that was 
however manageable and likely to be incurred only during the early stages of 
industrialization; (3) capable of being financed at least initially out of foreign 
trade surpluses generated by the more traditional sectors such as agriculture; 
and (4) likely to eventually be turned into a surplus as a result of a declining 
import ratio and an increasing ability to export. 
While import substitution growth did imply notably high annual rates of 
growth of industrial output (8 per cent on the average over the period 1950-70) 
without a rapid deterioration of the balance of payments, industrialization 
continued to be dependent on the importation of capital equipment. As a result, 
the foreign trade deficit persisted showing no significant tendency to decrease 
as a proportion of manufacturing output. 
DETERIORATION DUE TO IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
Many of Mexico's problems in the 1970s can be traced to increasing difficulties 
associated with the import substitution strategy initiated in the 1950s. This 
process is examined in greater detail below in an attempt to throw more light 
on the overall.decline in Mexican economic activity in the early 1970s. 
Although the level of tariffs in Mexico is generally low in comparison with 
other developing countries, quantitative controls account for most of the 
protection afforded domestic producers from foreign competition. Of. the 
quantitative controls import licences introduced in 1948 are by far the most impor-
tant. By 1970 around 65 per cent of the value of imports and ·a similar number 
of import items were covered by some form of import licencing requirement.9 
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Given the structure of protection, raw materials, intermediate goods and 
capital goods were fairly easy to import and paid lower import duties. Effective 
production for manufacturing final consumer goods therefore became higher over 
time than the nominal tariff pro.tection. The pattern of relative prices created by 
commercial policy gave producers incentives to gradually shift towards pro-
duction of consumer goods for the domestic market. Nondurable consumer 
goods decreased their relative share in total imports while imports of machinery 
and equipment increased their share from 23 per cent in 1940 to 36 per cent" 
in 1970. The infant industry argument was consistently applied and protection, 
once imposed, was never removed despite the fact that in principle import 
licensing could only be granted for periods of three to five years. 
Unquestionably, protectionism raised the profit rate in manufacturing. In 
so doing commercial policy discriminated against other sectors where expansion 
might have produced higher economic benefits. It seems ·correct to state that 
import substitution policies protected final consumer goods (especially tllose 
produced by traditional manufacturers, who generally satisfied total domestic 
demand) more than intermediate or capital goods. 
After the initial period of import substitution of nondurable consumer 
goods and certain intermediate goods in the 1940s and 1950s, industrial develop-
ment tended to shift in the 1960s to new lines of production such as consumer 
durable goods. In part the shift toward consumer durables was a response to 
the demand profile created by an increasingly unequal distribution of income; 
i.e., while the rapidly groWing incomes of the upper income groups created 
new markets for a variety of new consumer durables, the absence of a broad-
based middle income group inhibited the normal pattern of broad-based indus-
trial development experienced by the industrial countries at comparable levels 
of per capita income. The high levels of capital goods imported required by the 
new industries tended to counterbalance the reduction·in the trade deficit made 
by their direct contribution to import substitution. Moreover, the new durable 
consumer goods industries were largely developed by foreign capital. Because 
many of these companies repatriated profits, they had an additional negative 
impact of the country's balance of payments. Of course the underdevelopment 
of a capital goods industry all through this period contributed directly to the 
growing industrial trade deficit. 
The relative underdevelopment of the capital goods sector10 was critical in 
affecting the country's trade balance, yet the low observed rates of domestic 
expansion in this area cannot be explained simply in terms of the rapid expan-
sion. in demand for consumer durables and thus the relative attractiveness of 
investment in these areas. Government policy was also a contributing factor 
through its (1) establishment of a structure of protection, much more fayourable 
to consumer than to capital goods industries; (2) subsidization of capital goods 
imports; and (3) maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate. In combination 
these three factors were largely responsible for the high import ratio and income 
elasticity characterizing the capital goods sector during this period.11 
As a result of these developments, the capital goods sector made a major 
contribution to the expansion of industrial imports and the trade deficit. This 
pattern occurred despite an overall decline in the ratio of imports to total 
supply. Finally in the 1970s, the stage of relatively easy domestic substitution 
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for industrial imports had been completed. At this point the decline in the 
import ratio could not be sustained. 
This interpretation of the Mexican trade deficit, stressing the pattern of 
structural change, is consistent with the more orthodox interpretation emphasiz-
ing distortions caused by the structure of tariffs and quotas used by the govern-
ment to promote industrialization as a major factor in Mexican industry's 
inability to reduce its trade deficit. The orthodox position stresses the excessively 
high level of protection as a chief contributing factor to inefficiency and thus 
competitiveness in world markets. Admittedly, industrial exports did grow 
rapidly after 1965. In fact between 1967 and 1974, a period during which there 
was an acute deterioration in the balance of payments, the annual rate of growth 
of manufactured exports increased by 15 per cent. However, most of this 
increase was from the new border industries and thus did not reflect the overall 
competitive position of Mexican industry at this time.12 
CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE TO THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS DETERIORATION 
Agricultural output increased rapidly in Mexico between 1940 and 1965 due 
largely to increases in productivity resulting from (1) improved water control 
methods; (2) land reform; and (3) increased levels of agricultural extension 
services and agricultural research. During the 1940-65 period, agricultural 
production expanded at an average annual rate of over 6 per cent per annum 
in real terms.13 
In marked contrast output growth subsequently fell to only 1.2 per cent and 
during the second half of the 1960s agricultural exports mirrored the decline in 
production. In fact, the country was importing many of its basic grains and 
oilseeds by 1970. While the causes underlying agriculture's demise are somewhat 
controversial, three seem to stand out: (1) the decline in public investment in 
the sector; (2) credit policies; and (3) changes in relative prices. 
In particular the reduction in the proportion of public funds budgeted for 
agricultural investment seems to have played a critical role in agriculture's 
demise. The share of agriculture in public investment fell from about one-fifth 
in 1950 to less than one-tenth by 1960, and it was not until the late 1960s 
when agric)!lltural stagnation was evident that a greater proportion of the govern-
ment's capital allocations were devoted to the sector. The fall in public invest-
ment in agriculture was particularly serious because it appears to have induced 
a corresponding fall in private investment in the sector. The net result of these 
trends was a reduction in the share of investment in agriculture in gross fixed 
capital formation from 14.0 per cent in 1960 to 4.5 per cent in 1970. Significant 
is the fact that the share of agriculture in value added decreased from 15 .9 per 
cent to 11.6 per cent of the GDP during the same period. 
From all accounts the government's diminished role in agriculture was not so 
much the result of policies that were deliberately discriminatory, but rather 
simply of circumstances; (1) the expansion of the nationalized sector (with its 
drain on government funds); (2) a reduction in the income elasticity of tax 
collection; (3) rigid prices of products supplied by state-owned enterprises 
(which required more government support); and (4) fixed rates charged by the 
public utilities necessitating increasing transfer payments from the government.14 
64 BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH 
The drain on the government's budget caused by these four factors together 
with the objective of monetary stability resulted in spetrding ceilings with 
agriculture's allocations being determined more and more as a residual after 
other, more pressing claims had been met. 
Probably the factor of next importance in explaining the decline of agri-
culture is the adverse price effects which producers in the sector faced as a result 
of the import substitution strategy. Protectionism resulted in an anti-export 
bias, since export prices were governed by world markets and import substitutes 
were overpriced compared with world prices. For example in 1970 the effective 
protection rate of export activities had a minus 5 per cent level, while import 
substitutes had a plus 39 per cent. The decreasing share of manufactures that 
were exported is thus not surprising. Price changes due to protectionism con-
tributed to the worsening of relative agricultural prices. Effective protection 
for agriculture was 1 per cent while for manufacturing it was over 20 per cen{ 
The decline of agriculture had a number of ramifications. In addition to 
increasing rural poverty, agriculture's decline also had adverse effects upon the 
balance of payments. During 1961-65 the agricultural foreign trade surplus 
financed almost half of the industrial deficit, but by 1974, the deterioration of 
the sector's trade surplus had reached a point whereby it had ceased to be of 
any significance. In fact, there is a close correlation between the decline in the 
agricultural trade balance and the narrowing gap between agricultural production 
and per capita consumption. While per capita consumption of agricultural 
goods remained practically unchanged between 1964-65 and 1972-73, per 
capita production during the same period decreased by 15 per cent. 
The decline in per capita agricultural production continued into the 1970s, 
averaging 12 per cent during 1965-70 and 8 per cent in 1970-75. The effect on 
agriculture's trade balance at constant prices was also at least as important in 
the late 1960s as in the early 1970s. However, during the latter period deterior-
ating terms of trade between agricultural imports arid exports brought about 
a more rapid decline (in current prices) of the trade balance. 
Over the 1965-72 period, the effect of the decline in the agricultural surplus 
was concealed somewhat by the fact that international export prices grew 
faster than those for imports. Between 1972 and 1975, however, this pattern 
was reversed, and combined with the continued deterioration in trade balance 
at constant prices, the surplus in the trade balance measured at current prices 
was nearly eliminated.15 
OTHER FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS DETERIORATION 
The increase in the industrial deficit, together with the erosion of the agri-
cultural surplus, account for a large part of the growing disequilibrium in the 
trade balance. Other factors contributing to the country's external problems 
were the slowing down of oil production .(up until 1973) to a point where 
substantial deficits in the oil trade balance began to appear. Finally a number 
of incentives provided to the service sector did not stimulate development 
to the point where this sector was able to offiet the inability of agriculture 
to continue its financing of the industrial deficit. 
As expected, the growing inability of internal sources to finance the expansion 
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of industry finally resulted in a rapid increase in foreign debt. Between 1961 
and 1965 foreign loans financed only 7 per cent of the industrial deficit; by 
1975 this proportion had increased to 66 per cent. As a result net income paid 
abroad increased from 29 per cent of the deficit on current account in 1960-64 
to more than SO per cent in the 1974-77 period. It appears that the foreign 
debt was incurred mainly to finance the growing deficits in the current account 
balance. As noted above, however, these deficits originated with the decline in 
the trade balance. Current account deficits, therefore, created an equivalent 
deficit in the balance of net income paid abroad. By the rnid-1970s Mexico 
was falling into a vicious circle whereby the rate of foreign borrowing tended to 
be determined by the deficits, which were in turn caused at least in part by the 
very same accumulation of debts. 
The failure of industry to generate exports although simultaneously absorbing 
increased amounts of foreign exchange in the importation of capital and inter-
mediate goods 1s evidenced by the fact that by 1975 the income arising from the 
export of manufactures and minerals was not enough even to cover the interest 
payments on the foreign debt. Between 1960 and 1975 net property income 
paid abroad as a percentage of manufacturing and mineral exports had doubled. 
To summarize, the country's industrialization programme created a set of 
economic forces tending to cause a deterioration in the trade balance and in 
the balance of payments on current account. The deterioration became progres-
sively worse in the 1960s and clearly implied the occurrence, sooner or later, 
of an exchange rate crisis. 
While the country's development strategy created an environment conducive 
to foreign exchange instability, the actual peso crisis of 1976-77 was pre-
cipitated by three major factors: (1). the resurgence of domestic inflation; (2) 
the international economic recession; and (3) finally by a rapid acceleration in 
capital flight. 16 
EFFICIENCY OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
A survey article on Mexico in the Economist contained the following harsh 
judgment on the Echeverria period: 17 
Enter in 1979 President Luis Echeverria, a man whose political instinct 
far outran his political abilities, whose economic ambitions outran his 
economics, and whose populism outran his popularity. Exit in 1976 
three months after having devalued the peso following 22 years of financial 
stability, and thereby giving rise to fears for the stability of the whole 
Mexican system. 
In evaluating the Echeverria administration, however, particular attention 
should be drawn to the fact that a number of developments in the 1960s had 
made the economy less and less stable and more difficult to manage. The first 
factor was the growing substitutability between domestic consumption and 
exports with a major proportion of manufactured goods exported as residuals 
or surplus (after supplying domestic demand). A similar situation was develop-
ing in the mineral and agricultural sectors. The increased potential for sub-
stitution of internal for external demand was caused by (1) export diversification 
into new commodities; and (2) the stagnation of traditional exports such as 
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sugar, coffee, hard fibres, and minerals. Thus, changes in domestic activity had 
a significant influence on the current account deficit: (1) imports of capital 
goods expanded with domestic output; and (2) expanding domestic consump-
tion tended to divert exports towards the home market. Clearly, the more 
exports became substitutes for domestic goods the greater the chance of external 
imbalance. 
The other factor contributing to instability was the gradual undermining of 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. All through the 1960s the public sector 
deficit had fluctuated, with a tendency to increase as a percentage of GDP. 
Because a part of the deficit had to be financed domestically, a gradual upward 
trend developed in the central bank's reserve ratio until the usefulness of that 
instrument was greatly diminished. By 1970 deposit banks in Mexico City 
which handle half of the financial assets of the country had <so per cent of 
their liabilities turned in as reserve requirements while the reserve requirement 
for banks outs.ide Mexico City was 25 per cent. The overall ratio was 30 per cent 
for savings banks and 20 per cent for financial banks. 
In terms of ominous trends: 
1. from 1965 to 1970, public savings decreased from 0.056 to 0.038 as 
a share of the GDP; 
2. public investment on the other hand rose from 0~067 to 0.073 in the 
same period; and 
3. savings in financial institutions increased, also on a share basis from 
0.044 to 0.057 of the GDP, with half of these being channelled by the 
central bank into financing the public sector. 
In fact, monetary policy was quite effective all through the 1950s and 1960s 
in controlling the level and composition {between public and private) of credit. 
This was a period of general excess demand for funds and thus one where as 
John Koeler has.demonstrated any increase in the availability of funds brought 
about by the monetary authorities would immediately have been either borrowed 
or invested. 
Although at the beginning of the 1960s monetary policy still was an effective 
anti-recession instrument, by the end of the decade it had largely lost that 
capacity (assuming that the rapid expansion of financial assets had eliminated 
any excess demand for loanable funds). 18 In short the management of macro-
economic activity was becoming much more difficult through loss of monetary 
policy as an effective stabilizing instrument. This occurred siniultaneously with 
a growing incompatibility between internal and external equilibrium. 
One can outline the increasing incompatibility between domestic and external 
equilibrium in terms of the following sequence: 
I . an increase in public spending raises aggregate demand and gross domes-
tic product; 
2. productive capacity becomes strained, imports increase and exports are 
reduced by growing domestic demand with the current account deficit 
expanding; 
3. the current account deficit thus expallds; 
4. prices start increasing more rapidly; 
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5. to restore control of the balance of payments, the government reduces 
or slows its expenditures decreasing the GDP growth, thus slowing 
the upward movement of prices and imports; 
6. although the rate of growth of imports decreases, the new absolute 
level of the current account deficit in the balance of payments either 
stabilizes or expands at a slower rate; 
7. even if exports resume their expansion after the stabilization of aggre-
gate demand, they may only prevent the deficit from getting bigger, 
because an enlarged absolute deficit is necessary to support the higher 
level of output. 
67 
Thus the structure of the system was such that monetary policy, so successful 
as a stabilizing tool in the 1950s and 1960s, had little power to offset these 
trends developing towards the early 1970s. As Solis had noted: 19 
... from this perspective it becomes clear how damaging the 1964 failure 
of tax reform was, not only because it failed to add a new instrument to 
the arsenal of policy tools, but also because it accentuated conditions 
that would eventually cancel the flexibility of reserve requirements, the 
most powerful existing instrument. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In retrospect it seems clear that in order to evaluate fairly the Echeverria govern-
ment's attempts to make development less unequal, one must understand that 
the tendencies toward inequality, balance of payments disequilibrium, and 
slowing down of agricultural growth, among others, were in many ways a logical 
result of the policies followed in the postwar industrialization period. One 
should not start in 1970 but much earlier. At the same time, the political ele-
ments which gave rise to or even forced some key decisions during the period 
under discussion can be ignored only at serious risk. Finally, much more 
empirical work is needed on the short-term dynamics of the Mexican economy 
to prove fully the assertion that government investment displaced private invest-
ment activity. 
On the other hand the fact remains that most of the Echeverria administra-
tion's objectives were not met. If anything, income distribution became more 
unequal between 1970 and 1976. In this regard, therefore, the Echeverria policy 
of shared developmeht ( desarrollo compartido) was no more successful than 
the policies of his predecessors. The declining trend in agricultural production 
was not reversed, nor was the import substitution strategy of industrial develop-
ment with its inherent subsidization of industry at the expense of other sectors 
fundamentally altered under Echeverria. 
Job creation was no more adequate under Echeverria than it was during the 
1960s and indeed the problem probably worsened because of the lower rates 
of economic growth combined with demographic trends of the previous two 
decades. One accomplishment of the Echeverria scenario, perhaps the one that 
will have the greatest long-term consequences, was the institution of a popula-
tion programme. Except in the last days of the administration, there was no 
attempt to change significantly the land tenure pattern. 
In retrospect it appears the economic strategy adopted in the early 1970s 
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responded to a number of urgent political rather than economic concerns. 
Mexican leaders have some grounds for their belief that by preserving their 
established political system, they are enhancing the country's long-term capacity 
for effective economic management and the promotion of development. In this 
light Echeverria's economic strategy is best evaluated not as a mere product of 
arbitrary and irresponsible personal leadership, but as a reasonable rational 
attempt to reinvigorate that political system, accepting a certain loss of short-
term economic equilibrium as the price. Clearly, the short-term economic 
consequences were far more extensive than-anticipated. 
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